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a b s t r a c t
Amnesic patients with bilateral hippocampal damage sustained in adulthood are generally unable to
construct scenes in their imagination. By contrast, patients with developmental amnesia (DA), where
hippocampal damage was acquired early in life, have preserved performance on this task, although the
reason for this sparing is unclear. One possibility is that residual function in remnant hippocampal tissue
is sufﬁcient to support basic scene construction in DA. Such a situation was found in the one amnesic
patient with adult-acquired hippocampal damage (P01) who could also construct scenes. Alternatively,
DA patients’ scene construction might not depend on the hippocampus, perhaps being instead reliant on
non-hippocampal regions and mediated by semantic knowledge. To adjudicate between these two
possibilities, we examined scene construction during functional MRI (fMRI) in Jon, a well-characterised
patient with DA who has previously been shown to have preserved scene construction. We found that
when Jon constructed scenes he activated many of the regions known to be associated with imagining
scenes in control participants including ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, retrosplenial
and posterior parietal cortices. Critically, however, activity was not increased in Jon's remnant
hippocampal tissue. Direct comparisons with a group of control participants and patient P01, conﬁrmed
that they activated their right hippocampus more than Jon. Our results show that a type of non-
hippocampal dependent scene construction is possible and occurs in DA, perhaps mediated by semantic
memory, which does not appear to involve the vivid visualisation of imagined scenes.
& 2013 The authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Patients with bilateral hippocampal damage and concomitant
amnesia are generally unable to construct and visualise spatially-
coherent scenes in their mind's eye (Andelman, Hooﬁen, Goldberg,
Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire,
2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Mullally, Intraub, &
Maguire, 2012; Tulving, 1985; but see Squire et al., 2010, and
Maguire & Hassabis, 2011, for a response). It has been suggested
that scene construction is required for episodic memory, imagin-
ing the future and spatial navigation, and that losing the ability to
construct and visualise scenes may account for some of the
symptomology of hippocampal amnesia (Hassabis & Maguire,
2007, 2009; Maguire & Mullally, in press). However, there are
patients with bilateral hippocampal damage and profound amne-
sia who seem able to construct scenes, which appears to challenge
this view.
For instance, Hassabis et al. (2007) noted that one of their ﬁve
amnesic patients (P01, called KN in Aggleton et al., 2005; McKenna &
Gerhand, 2002) could construct spatially-coherent scenes and describe
personal future events, in marked contrast to the other four patients
(Fig. 1). Using functional MRI (fMRI) it has recently been shown that
P01 activated the remnant of his right hippocampus while construct-
ing scenes (Mullally, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2012). Thus, P01 appeared
to have sufﬁciently preserved function in his right hippocampal tissue
to support basic scene construction, a ﬁnding that reinforces the role
played by the hippocampus in scene construction.
The patients alluded to above acquired their hippocampal damage
in adulthood. By contrast, developmental amnesia (DA) occurs follow-
ing a hypoxic/ischemic incident perinatally or in early childhood,
resulting in bilateral hippocampal pathology (Gadian et al., 2000;
Isaacs et al., 2003; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Vargha-Khadem et al.,
2003). A distinguishing feature of DA compared to adult-onset
amnesia is that the entire content of semantic memory and world
knowledge, which is rich and age appropriate, has been accumulated
after the onset of bilateral hippocampal pathology (Vargha-Khadem
et al., 1997). Another distinguishing feature has recently been
observed, namely, that DA patients appear able to construct scenes.
This was ﬁrst reported in patient Jon who, now an adult, is one of the
best characterised DA patients (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Jon
sustained his hippocampal damage perinatally, with a volume loss
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of approximately 50% bilaterally (Gadian et al., 2000). He subsequently
presented with symptoms of DA at an early age, and while severely
amnesic for his personal life events, Jon has been able to acquire an
impressive body of semantic knowledge (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997).
He could also successfully construct ﬁctitious scenes and imagine
future events (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010; Fig. 1).
Similarly, in a study involving 21 school-age patients with moderate
memory impairment or DA from neonatal exposure to hypoxia-
ischaemia, Cooper, Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, and Maguire (2011)
observed intact scene construction relative to age-matched controls,
as did Hurley, Maguire, and Vargha-Khadem (2011) (but see Kwan,
Carson, Addis, & Rosenbaum, 2010) when testing another DA patient
HC (DA E6 in Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003 and Isaacs et al., 2003; DA
6 in Adlam, Malloy, Mishkin, & Vargha-Khadem, 2009), thus conﬁrm-
ing that intact scene construction appears to be a consistent feature
of DA.
The reason for the apparently preserved scene construction in
DA is not clear, but understanding its neural substrate is critical for
evaluating the role of the hippocampus in constructing scenes.
In order to examine this issue further, we investigated patient Jon's
scene construction ability using fMRI. One hypothesis is that, like
P01, Jon (and other patients with DA), may be able to construct
scenes because of residual function in remnant hippocampal
tissue. If one considers the cases of Jon and P01, this seems
plausible as both Jon and P01 share a number of similarities. Both
are densely amnesic suffering from a profound impairment of
episodic memory. Both have signiﬁcant hippocampal volume loss
(of approximately 50% bilaterally), but have nevertheless acquired
semantic knowledge post-lesion (Jon: Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997;
P01: McKenna & Gerhand, 2002), and activity in residual hippo-
campal tissue has been documented in both patients. In the case of
Jon this was observed during an autobiographical memory recall
task (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001), while for P01,
right hippocampal activity was observed during semantic learning
(see Hassabis et al., 2007—Supplementary material) and scene
construction (Mullally et al., 2012). It is therefore possible that
Jon's remnant hippocampal tissue might be involved in supporting
his seemingly preserved scene construction ability.
However, against this backdrop of commonalities, Jon differs
from P01, and from healthy participants in an important way.
Fig. 1. Patient Jon. (A) Shows a coronal view from Jon's MRI brain scan. (B) Scores on the scene construction Experiential Index (a measure of the overall richness of imagined
scenes). (C) Scores on the scene construction Spatial Coherence Index (a measure of the spatial contiguousness of imagined scenes). Data are from the Hassabis et al. (2007)
scene construction task, where each dot represents the data point of a patient with amnesia whose bilateral hippocampal damage was sustained in adulthood (n¼5) and ten
matched control participants. These include Patient P01, who is highlighted. The data points for Jon are highlighted with an arrow. Vertical bars signify means for each group.
Jon performed similarly to the mean of the control participants and signiﬁcantly better than the other patients with hippocampal damage and amnesia.
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While P01 (Hassabis et al., 2007; Mullally et al., 2012) and controls
(Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007) described scene construc-
tion as effortless and natural, Jon reported that he found the
process effortful, and describes it as something which he has had
to train himself to accomplish (Maguire et al., 2010). It is therefore
possible that while P01 and controls engage in similar scene
construction processes, Jon's scene construction may be phenom-
enologically distinct and could be supported by a distinct neural
network. Perhaps in DA, preserved semantic and world knowledge
is sufﬁcient to sustain a process akin to scene construction but
which does not permit the vivid visualisation of spatially-coherent
scenes, and which does not therefore depend on the hippocampus.
Based on behavioural data alone it is impossible to ascertain how
similar to normal scene construction the DA patients' experiences are,
given that they may never have truly imagined a scene, making the
accuracy of their introspections difﬁcult to interpret. However, exam-
ining the brain regions supporting their scene construction processes
could offer some insights into this issue. Jon may activate the ‘core’
scene network (which includes the medial temporal lobes (MTL),
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), posterior parietal cortex,
precuneus, and retrosplenial cortex) similar to that activated by
controls (Hassabis et al., 2007; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Summer-
ﬁeld, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2010) and P01 (Mullally et al., 2012). On the
other hand, he may fail to display hippocampal or any MTL activation
when he constructs scenes. This could be accompanied by normal
activation of the rest of the core network, up-regulation of brain areas
within the core network, or recruitment of additional brain areas that
are not usually engaged by control participants during scene
construction.
Using an fMRI paradigm adapted from Hassabis et al. (2007)
and identical to that used in the study of P01 (Mullally et al., 2012)
we examined the brain areas supporting Jon's scene construction.
At the time of testing, Jon was similar in age to the healthy controls
scanned previously by Hassabis et al. (2007), enabling us to draw
comparisons between them. In addition, and despite their differ-
ing aetiologies and ages, Jon and P01 had so much in common that
it was also of interest to make comparisons between the two
patients. We hypothesised that, unlike the controls and P01, the
non-hippocampal components of the ‘core’ network would sup-
port Jon's scene construction, because we suspected his effortful
construction did not rely on true hippocampal-dependent visua-
lisation of spatially-coherent scenes.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
2.1.1. Patient Jon
Patient Jon, who was 32 years old at time of testing, is a well-documented case
of DA. Brieﬂy, he was born prematurely at 26 weeks of gestation. He weighed less
than 1 kg, suffered breathing problems and during his ﬁrst 6 weeks of life required
intubation and positive pressure ventilation for severe apnoeic attacks (Gadian
et al., 2000). He subsequently showed steady improvement and normal develop-
ment, but by the age of ﬁve memory problems were noted, and have since
continued to be prominent. Direct measurement of Jon's MRI scans in adulthood
indicated a reduction of 50% in the volume of left and right hippocampi, with no
evident pathology in the rest of the MTL (Gadian et al., 2000; Vargha-Khadem et al.,
1997). Consistent with his hippocampal abnormality, Jon has difﬁculty in reliably
ﬁnding his way. He also tends to forget where belongings are normally kept, has
problems remembering everyday events such as TV programmes just seen and is
typically unable to give a detailed account of his activities earlier in the day.
2.1.2. Control participants
Our aim was to examine Jon as a single case to ascertain if his preserved ability
to construct ﬁctitious scenes was accompanied by engagement of his remnant
hippocampal tissue during fMRI. However, we also performed comparisons
between Jon and a group of control participants in order to examine the wider
set of brain areas engaged during scene construction. There were 21 control
participants (10 males; mean age 24.8 years (SD 3.8); age range 18–31 years) whose
results were reported previously by Hassabis et al. (2007).
2.1.3. Patient P01
We were also interested in comparing Jon with patient P01. His case has been
described in detail elsewhere (Aggleton et al., 2005; McKenna & Gerhand, 2002;
Mullally et al., 2012). To summarise, this male, right-handed former industrial
biochemist, who was 51 years old at the time of his fMRI scan, had contracted
meningeo-encephalitis at the age of 34 and then recurrent meningitis. He was left
without useful motor function below T12, loss of vision in the lower visual ﬁeld,
and severe amnesia. While his structural MRI scans showed bilateral abnormalities
in the occipital lobes, the main locus of volume reduction was in the hippocampi
(reduced by 48.8% on the left and 46.2% on the right).
All participants performed the same tasks (with minor modiﬁcations—see
details below), in the same MRI scanner, using the same image acquisition
parameters, and identical data analysis protocol. All gave informed written consent
to participation in accordance with the local research ethics committee.
2.2. Tasks and procedure
The control participants (reported in Hassabis et al., 2007) performed six trial
types: construct a novel ﬁctitious scene, construct a novel acontextual object, recall
a recent autobiographical memory, recall a previously viewed acontextual object,
recall a previously imagined ﬁctitious scene, recall a previously imagined acontex-
tual object. Each trial had an identical structure. First, participants were presented
with a trial cue (e.g. ‘IMAGINE…Standing on a crowded platform of a train station’).
The trial cue remained on screen for 5.5 s and was then replaced by a “Close your
eyes and imagine” instruction. Participants then closed their eyes and began to
visualise as vividly as possible. During this 16 s visualisation period participants
were required to focus on the memory, scene or object they were recalling or
imagining. A 1 s audio tone signalled the end of the visualisation period (at which
point participants had to open their eyes) and the start of the ratings phase. Using
an MR-compatible ﬁve-button keypad, participants scored their just-visualised
memory, scene or object across four ratings: difﬁculty (how difﬁcult was the trial:
1, very easy…5, very hard), vividness (salience of the imagery: 1, not vivid…5, very
vivid), spatial coherence (contiguousness of the spatial context: 1, an isolated
object…5, a contiguous scene), and memory (how much like a memory the
visualised scene or object was: 1, nothing at all like a memory…5, exactly like a
memory). They had 4.5 s to respond for each rating. This was followed by a 1 s
period of rest before the cue for the next trial was presented. A baseline control
condition was also included. Here participants had to imagine a white cross on a
black background. This was followed by one rating (‘how focused on the cross did
you manage to stay: 1, not at all focused…5, very focused). Detailed instructions
and multiple practice trials were given to participants prior to scanning to ensure
that they were conﬁdently able to adhere to task requirements. Training included
how to imagine the single, novel objects in the mind's eye (in response to an on-
screen cue, e.g. “imagine a spool of bright green thread”), in isolation and against a
blank background. The novel, ﬁctitious scenes (e.g. “imagine standing on the
crowded platform of a train station”) were to be as vivid and life-like as possible,
and they were instructed to imagine all aspects of the scenes (such as the
surrounding environment, how it looked, felt, smelled, and sounded). For the
scene task it was repeatedly emphasised that they should not simply recall an
experience they have had, but they should create something new, and for objects
not to simply bring to mind a familiar object, but again to imagine an entirely new
object. Key task instructions were reinforced between each of the scanning
sessions.
We used a very similar paradigm for Jon and P01 (Mullally et al., 2012). Three
minor adaptations were made to assist the amnesic patients. First, the scenario cue
appeared on the screen throughout the visualisation period, accompanied by the
words ‘You should now be imagining [cue]’, in case the patient opened his eyes and
could not recall the task (Fig. 2). Second, for the ratings, instead of one-word cues
being used (e.g. ‘Difﬁculty?’) a full question was used (‘How difﬁcult was that?’),
with 0.5 s extra added per rating to allow for the additional reading. Third, just two
of the experimental tasks were included from the original Hassabis et al. (2007)
protocol, namely, constructing scenes and constructing single acontextual objects
for the ﬁrst time in the scanner. The other tasks—recall of recent autobiographical
memories, recall of previously viewed objects, recall of previously imagined scenes
and recall of previously imagined objects could not be included given the patients’
amnesia.
Jon and P01 therefore performed an experiment with two main experimental
conditions (imagining scenes and imagining objects). Each of these conditions had
20 trials. Ten baseline control trials (imagining a white cross on a black back-
ground) were also included, yielding a total of 50 trials presented across three
scanning sessions. Prior to scanning, Jon (and P01) received extensive training to
ensure he was thoroughly familiarized with all aspects of the task, including task
cues, instructions, timings and key presses, and to conﬁrm that he could retain the
instructions during the scanning session. The spatial coherence rating collected at
the end of each experimental trial provided an important internal check, enabling
us to verify that Jon had retained the task cue throughout the trial (i.e. if the trial
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was an object trial, then it should be rated low on the coherence scale and as ‘an
isolated object’, whereas if the cue described a scene, then the trial should be rated
higher and be considered ‘a contiguous scene’).
Immediately following scanning, participants were thoroughly debriefed. Jon
and P01 were asked a number of additional questions to attempt to ascertain how
they had performed the task under the constraints imposed by their amnesia. For
example, they were asked to describe what they had been doing during scanning,
and to report the task instructions. In addition, three of the scene cues and three of
the object cues that had been presented during scanning were re-presented, one at
a time (two scene/object cues were re-presented to controls). All participants were
then asked to imagine the scene (or object) and to provide a description of this out
loud. This provided an indication of the participants’ scene construction abilities. In
the case of Jon and P01, they were then asked to describe how they went about
constructing a scene in their mind's eye, and were asked to reﬂect on how effortful
they found scene construction.
2.3. Behavioural data analysis
Data are presented as mean values7SD. Statistical signiﬁcance was calculated
by looking at differences in the ranked position order of Jon's ratings for the scene
trials and the object trials (Mann–Whitney U test). All tests performed were two-
tailed and differences were considered statistically signiﬁcant at po0.05.
2.4. Scanning parameters and preprocessing
T2n-weighted echo planar images (EPI) with blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) contrast were acquired on a 1.5 T Siemens AG (Erlangen, Germany) Sonata
MRI scanner. Scanning parameters were selected to achieve whole brain coverage:
45 oblique axial slices angled at 30 degrees in the anterior–posterior axis, 2 mm
thickness (1 mm gap), repetition time 4.05 s, slice time 90 ms, TE 50 ms, ﬁeld of
view 192 mm, 6464 matrix, in-plane resolution 33 mm. The ﬁrst 6 ‘dummy’
volumes from each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
Field maps were acquired with a standard manufacturer's double echo gradient
echo ﬁeld map sequence (short TE¼10 ms, long TE¼14.76 ms; whole brain cover-
age; voxel size, 333 mm). A T1-weighted structural scan was also acquired
with 1 mm isotropic resolution. Data were analysed using the statistical parametric
mapping software SPM8 (www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The Hassabis et al. (2007)
control participants’ data were re-analysed in SPM8 to allow for direct comparison
with Jon's data. Spatial preprocessing consisted of realignment and unwarping
(using ﬁeld maps), normalization to a standard EPI template in Montreal Neuro-
logical Institute (MNI) space with a resampled voxel size of 333 mm, and
smoothing using a Gaussian kernel with full width at half maximum of 8 mm.
2.5. fMRI data analysis
After preprocessing, statistical analysis was performed using the general linear
model. The experiment had two main imagining conditions (scenes and objects)
and one baseline control (ﬁxation cross) condition. We modelled the time period
from the start of the visualisation period (from the ‘close your eyes and imagine’
cue) until the end of the visualisation period as a boxcar function of 16 s duration.
This was convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response function to create
regressors of interest. Jon's movement parameters were included as regressors of
no interest and the subject-speciﬁc parameter estimates pertaining to each
regressor (betas) were calculated for each voxel. First level contrasts were
performed on these parameter estimates. As in Hassabis et al. (2007), we report
the fMRI results at a voxel-level threshold of po0.001 whole brain uncorrected
(minimum cluster size of 5 voxels). We report all areas activated at this threshold.
A direct comparison of Jon's fMRI data with that of the control participants
(n¼21) was also performed. First, we identiﬁed regions that were more active in
the control participants than in Jon. We therefore subtracted Jon's ‘scenes4objects’
contrast image from each of the control's corresponding ‘scenes4objects’ contrast
images, and entered the resulting differences images into a one sample t-test. This
enabled us to identify all of the regions that were more active in the control group
than in Jon during the scene construction trials (see http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.
uk/people/rik.henson/personal/Henson_Singlecase_06.pdf). Next, we reversed the
procedure and subtracted each of the control's contrast images from Jon's contrast
image (for the ‘scenes4objects’ comparison). Again the resulting twenty one
difference images were entered into a one sample t-test. Due to the ﬁxed-effects
nature of this analysis we report all areas activated at a voxel-level threshold of
po0.05 (whole-brain FWE corrected; minimum cluster size of 5 voxels).
We then compared Jon's scene construction network with that of patient P01
(Mullally et al., 2012). We did this by comparing the ‘P01-Controls’ difference
images [constructed by individually subtracting each of the control's contrast
images (for the ‘scenes4objects’ comparison) from P01’s scenes4objects contrast
images] to ‘Jon-Controls’ difference images [constructed by individually subtracting
each of the control's contrast images (for the ‘scenes4objects’ comparison) from
Jon's scenes4objects contrast images] using a two samples t-test. As before, we
report all areas activated at a voxel-level threshold of po0.05 (whole-brain FWE
corrected; minimum cluster size of 5 voxels).
Finally, using anatomical masks for the hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex
and retrosplenial cortex we extracted the average parameter estimates within each
of these regions for the scenes4objects contrast for Jon, P01 and each of the 21
control participants. The anatomical masks were delineated by an experienced
researcher not involved in the project on an averaged structural MRI brain scan
from a different set of n¼30 control participants and segmentation was guided by
Duvernoy (1999) and Vann, Aggleton, and Maguire (2009). The masks were visually
inspected on each participant to ensure that no CSF, or grey/white matter from
neighbouring regions was included.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioural data
3.1.1. Ratings
After each visualisation period throughout the scanning session Jon
rated the imagined objects and scenes in terms of their difﬁculty,
vividness, coherence and similarity to a memory (using a ﬁve point
scale). In terms of trial difﬁculty, Jon did not report ﬁnding the scenes
more difﬁcult to imagine than the objects (objects: mean¼1.3,
SD¼0.98; scenes: mean¼1.55, SD¼0.94; U¼163.5, Z¼1.42,
P¼0.16). He did, however, rate his constructed objects as signiﬁcantly
more vivid than his constructed scenes (objects: mean¼4.8, SD¼0.7;
scenes: mean¼4.25, SD¼0.7; U¼122.5, Z¼2.6, Po0.01), perhaps
betraying his difﬁculty imagining truly vivid scenes. He tended to rate
the scenes as more like memories than the imagined objects (objects:
mean¼2.73, SD¼1.39; scenes: mean¼3.5, SD¼1.47; U¼134.5,
Z¼1.82, P¼0.07) although this difference did not reach statistical
signiﬁcance. Most importantly, however, Jon rated the scenes as
‘coherent’ (mean¼4.75, SD¼1.0) and the objects as signiﬁcantly less
‘scene-like’ (mean¼2.53, SD¼1.85; U¼43, Z¼3.72, Po0.01). This
shows that, despite his amnesia, Jon managed to successfully retain
the task instructions throughout the scanning session and was able to
recall the cue beyond the 16 s visualisation period. Finally, following
the baseline control trials, Jon reported that he was able to maintain a
high level of focus (mean¼3.88, SD¼1.25).
Table 1 shows Jon's behavioural ratings alongside those of the
control participants and P01. They were highly comparable in terms of
difﬁculty, vividness and coherence. Although Jon ﬁnds constructing
scenes effortful and does so bit by bit, he is intelligent and well-
practised at it, so it is perhaps not surprising that his ratings were
Fig. 2. Timeline of an example scene construction trial from Jon's fMRI study. See Section 2 for full details.
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similar to the control subjects. On the other hand, as noted above,
despite being amnesic Jon rated his imagined scenes (and objects) as
being more similar to memories compared to the control subjects. This
highlights a potential caveat. As we have pointed out elsewhere
(Cooper et al., 2011), given that patients with developmental amnesia
sustain such early hippocampal damage and may never have known
what it is like to truly imagine a scene or event, then in the absence of
any comparator, their ratings may be more difﬁcult to interpret. For
instance, Jon may have rated his constructions as similar to memories
because they comprised semantic information, and this may be the
only type of information to which he had access. This situation is in
contrast to amnesic patients whose hippocampal damage is acquired
in adulthood who, in our experience, are acutely aware that some
of their abilities have changed post-lesion and make their ratings
accordingly.
3.1.2. Debrieﬁng
In a previous behavioural study (Maguire et al., 2010) we
reported on Jon's scene construction performance in detail and
provided examples of his imagined scenes. Overall, he performed
comparably to controls on measures of scene content—spatial
references, entities present and thoughts/emotions/actions. His
score for sensory descriptions was borderline impaired, which
may betray the effortful nature of his visualising. His rating of the
spatial coherence of constructed scenes was also indistinguishable
from controls. In the current fMRI study, we focussed on checking
that his scene construction remained at a similar level. After
scanning, Jon was presented with three scene and three object
cues that had been given during scanning and was asked to
imagine each one this time out loud. As before, he was able to
describe detailed and coherent scenes. Of note, however, he
characterised the scene construction process as effortful, and as
one that he “has had to work at”. Jon reported that he does not
initially visualise “a deﬁnite image that has everything in it”,
rather he constructs the scene bit by bit, and the scene “is not an
instant picture”. In addition, he stated that he does not visualise
scenes in everyday life and that he would not describe himself as a
visualising person in relation to scenes. P01’s post-scan testing
(detailed in full in Mullally et al., 2012) conﬁrmed the preserved
nature of his scene construction. In contrast to Jon, however, P01
noted that “most of the scene comes in one shot” and described
the addition of the extra details as akin to “colouring in a colour
book.” He noted that he does not ﬁnd scene construction an
effortful process but something that comes quite naturally to him.
3.2. Neuroimaging data
3.2.1. Jon's scene construction network
In order to appreciate the brain areas engaged when Jon
constructed novel ﬁctitious scenes, we compared activity associated
with the imagination of these scenes relative to the imagination of
single acontextual objects (scenes4objects). We observed
increased activity in VMPFC, bilaterally in the superior frontal sulci,
posterior cingulate, retrosplenial and posterior parietal cortices
(Table 2 and Fig. 3A). Thus, Jon appeared to engage many of the
regions typically activated when control participants (such as those
reported in Hassabis et al., 2007) construct novel scenes relative to
novel objects (Table 2 and Fig. 3B). The striking overlap between
Jon's activation pattern (in retrosplenial, posterior parietal and
frontal regions) and that associated with the Hassabis et al.
(2007) controls is highlighted in Fig. 4A, where Jon's activation
clusters clearly lie within the controls’ scene construction network.
In addition to these overlapping regions of activity, what is also
striking is that Jon did not appear to activate any MTL structures
while constructing his scenes (Table 2, Fig. 3A). In order to explore
this difference further, we ﬁrst lowered the threshold for statistical
signiﬁcance to 0.005 (whole-brain uncorrected) for Jon's scene-
s4objects contrast to check for any sub-threshold voxels of activity
within these regions. Two small clusters of activity were observed
in right (30, 34, 17; Z¼2.98) and left (21, 22. 22; Z¼2.99)
parahippocampal cortex. However, no increase in activity was
observed in either hippocampus. These results therefore differ from
those observed in control participants, who show extensive para-
hippocampal and right hippocampal activity (Fig. 3B).
3.2.2. Comparisons between Jon and the control participants
To assess this apparent difference between Jon's scene construction
network and that of controls, we directly compared Jon's data
Table 2
FMRI results.
Region Peak coordinate (x, y, z) Z
Jon
Scenes4objects
Left ventromedial prefrontal cortex 3, 65, 16 4.09
Left superior frontal sulcus 18, 29, 55 4.19
Right superior frontal sulcus 21, 29, 55 4.12
Left middle frontal gyrus 21, 1, 67 3.97
Left precentral gyrus 18, 31, 70 3.84
Right posterior cingulate cortex 6, 37, 37 5.07
Left posterior cingulate cortex 3, 31, 40 3.67
Right retrosplenial cortex 15, 55, 16 5.15
Left retrosplenial cortex 3, 55, 16 4.15
Right precuneus 3, 64, 46 5.26
Left precuneus 15, 67, 46 4.82
18, 52, 49 3.70
Right posterior parietal cortex/angular gyrus 42, 82, 31 5.58
Left posterior parietal cortex/angular gyrus 51, 70, 28 3.76
48, 76, 19 3.59
Right superior occipital cortex 21, 103, 4 3.70
Right inferior occipital cortex 33, 97, 8 3.63
Control participantsa
Scenes4objects
Right ventromedial prefrontal cortex 3, 24, 9 4.27
Right superior frontal sulcus 27, 27, 45 4.42
Right middle temporal cortex 57, 6, 24 3.70
Right hippocampus 21, 24, 12 3.86
Left parahippocampal gyrus 18, 36, 15 4.28
Right parahippocampal gyrus 33, 42, 12 4.43
Left retrosplenial cortex 12, 60, 9 6.08
Right retrosplenial cortex 12, 57, 15 5.52
Right precuneus 9, 57, 48 3.91
Left posterior parietal cortex 48, 78, 24 4.75
Right posterior parietal cortex 45, 66, 24 4.75
a Data from Hassabis et al. (2007). Note that the scenes4objects analysis
reported here for the control participants (unlike the contrast reported in Hassabis
et al., 2007) is restricted to items newly-imaged in the scanner, in order to be
identical to the tasks performed by Jon.
Table 1
Behavioural ratings.
Difﬁculty Vividness Coherence Memory
SCENES
Controls 1.85 (0.45) 3.91 (0.64) 3.91 (0.58) 1.94 (0.33)
Jon 1.55 4.25 4.75 3.50
P01 1 4.95 5 2.9
OBJECTS
Controls 1.65 (0.44) 4.09 (0.43) 1.67 (0.56) 1.74 (0.54)
Jon 1.3 4.8 2.53 2.73
P01 1.4 5 1 1.4
Means and between subjects SDs for the controls (data from Hassabis et al., 2007),
means for Jon (see text for within subject SDs) and P01 (see Mullally et al., 2012 for
within subject SDs).
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(scenes4objects) with that of the control participants (Table 3). As
anticipated, the control participants activated their right hippocampus
more than Jon (Fig. 4B), as well as right perirhinal cortex, and VMPFC.
Jon, on the other hand, activated his right retrosplenial cortex, bilateral
posterior cingulate cortex, left lateral orbital gyrus, left precentral
gyrus and left middle frontal gyrus (Fig. 4C) more than controls. This
suggests that Jon, unlike controls, was constructing his scenes in a
non-hippocampal fashion, perhaps relying upon components of the
Fig. 3. fMRI results. (A) Brain areas more active for constructing scenes compared to imagining single acontextual objects in patient Jon. The upper left panel shows the
sagittal image from a “glass brain”which enables one to appreciate activations at all locations and levels in the brain simultaneously. Activations are shown on sagittal (upper
right panel), axial (lower left panel) and coronal (lower right panel) images from Jon's structural MRI scan at a threshold of po0.001 (whole brain, uncorrected). The colour
bar indicates the z-scores associated with each voxel. L¼ left side of the brain, R¼right side of the brain. (B) The same contrast in control participants (data from Hassabis
et al., 2007) shown on the averaged structural MRI scan of those participants at a threshold of po0.001 (whole brain, uncorrected).
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scene construction network (such as the retrosplenial cortex), and the
recruitment of additional frontal regions, to a greater extent than
control participants.
Fig. 5 shows the average parameter estimates from three
regions (deﬁned using anatomical masks – see Section 2) within
the core network for Jon and the control participants – the
hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex and retrosplenial cortex
for the scenes – objects contrast. This conﬁrms that the left
hippocampus, even in controls participants was not signiﬁcantly
engaged by the task compared to the right hippocampus (as
reported by Hassabis et al., 2007), and that Jon's right hippocam-
pus was much less engaged than the right hippocampus of
controls. By contrast, Jon's retrosplenial cortex was more active
compared with the control subjects.
We also examined the average parameter estimates within the
right hippocampus (delineated with an anatomical mask – see
Section 2) to determine the pattern of activity for scene, object and
ﬁxation baseline conditions (Fig. 6). It is clear that there was very
little activity in Jon's right hippocampus for any condition, and
signiﬁcantly much less than that of the control participants.
3.2.3. Comparisons between Jon and P01
Patient P01 also activated his right hippocampus while con-
structing scenes (reported in detail in Mullally et al., 2012). In
summary, we found that scene construction in P01 was associated
with increased activity in a set of brain areas including medial
temporal, retrosplenial and posterior parietal cortices, that over-
lapped considerably with the regions engaged in the control
participants performing the same task. Most notably, the remnant
of P01’s right hippocampus exhibited increased activity during
scene construction compared with the control participants. We
therefore hypothesised that P01 would show signiﬁcantly greater
hippocampal activation than Jon. As illustrated in Fig. 7 and
Table 3, this is what we found (see also Fig. 5), with P01’s right
hippocampus signiﬁcantly more active than Jon's as he con-
structed novel scenes. Jon activated several regions more than
P01 (Table 3); primary peaks: right superior frontal gyrus, right
lateral occipital cortex; right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left
Fig. 4. Comparisons between Jon and the control participants. (A) The overlap between Jon and control participants—blue blobs are activations from Jon and yellow blobs are
the activations for the control participants from Hassabis et al. (2007). Data are shown at po0.005 for display purposes on axial images from the averaged structural MRI
scan of the control participants. (B) The regions activated more by controls than by Jon during scene construction at a threshold of po0.05 (FWE-corrected, whole brain)
shown on a sagittal slice from the averaged structural MRI scan of the control participants. (C) The regions activated more by Jon than the controls during scene construction
at a threshold of po0.05 (FWE-corrected, whole brain) shown on a sagittal slice from the averaged structural MRI scan of the control participants. The colour bars indicate
the z-scores associated with each voxel. L¼ left side of the brain, R¼right side of the brain. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 3
Comparison of Jon's fMRI data (scenes4objects) with controls and P01.
Region Peak Coordinate (x, y, z) Z
Controls4 Jon
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 0, 20, 11 5.39
Right hippocampus 30, 37, 5 5.60
Right perirhinal cortex 30, 28, 29 5.72
Jon4controls
Left middle frontal gyrus 21, 1, 67 5.96
Left lateral orbital gyrus 27, 41, 11 6.00
Left precentral gyrus 18, 34, 70 6.56
Right retrosplenial cortex 12, 46, 16 6.17
Right posterior parietal cortex 9, 37, 34 6.18
Left posterior parietal cortex 3, 37, 28 5.41
P014 Jon
Right hippocampus 36, 28, 11 7.84
30, 46, 2 6.98
30, 37, 5 6.70
Jon4P01
Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 60, 14, 25 7.77
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 57, 5, 40 7.56
Right superior frontal gyrus 18, 35, 37 48.0
Left precuneus 3, 61, 46 7.48
Left inferior temporal gyrus 60, 10, 26 7.59
Right visual cortex 6, 103, 1 7.72
Right lateral occipital cortex 48, 49, 14 48.0
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dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right visual cortex, left inferior
temporal gyrus and left precuneus.
4. Discussion
Patients with DA resulting from early bilateral hippocampal
damage such as Jon have consistently been found to retain the
ability to mentally construct scenes (Cooper et al., 2011; Hurley
et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010). This stands in contrast to
patients with amnesia whose hippocampal damage was sustained
in adulthood who typically show a scene construction impairment
(e.g. Hassabis et al., 2007; Mullally et al., 2012). Until now, it has
been uncertain whether the form of scene construction expressed
by patients with DA depends upon the hippocampus. Using fMRI
we investigated the neural network supporting the well-
characterised patient Jon's scene construction, and whether this
would include activation of his remnant hippocampal tissue.
When Jon engaged in scene construction he activated many of
the regions known to be associated with imagining scenes and
imagining the future in control participants (e.g. Hassabis et al.,
2007; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Summerﬁeld, Hassabis, &
Maguire, 2009; Summerﬁeld et al., 2010), including VMPFC,
posterior cingulate, retrosplenial and posterior parietal cortices.
Critically, however, activity was not increased in the key region of
interest, Jon's remnant hippocampal tissue, even when more
liberal statistical thresholds were applied. Direct comparisons with
a group of control participants and also another single case,
patient P01 (Mullally et al., 2012), conﬁrmed that they activated
their right hippocampus more than Jon. By contrast, Jon engaged
his retrosplenial cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and several
additional areas within frontal cortex more than controls.
A failure to observe increased hippocampal activity associated
with Jon's scene construction does not mean that there was no
activity in Jon's hippocampus as he performed this task—we
acknowledge that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
However, our ﬁndings show that activity in this region was
insufﬁciently strong to be detected using the same tasks, imaging
techniques and statistical analyses that were able to detect
increased hippocampal engagement in controls and also in
another amnesic patient with signiﬁcant hippocampal volume
loss, P01. Similarly, when directly compared to the controls and
P01, Jon's hippocampal activity was signiﬁcantly less.
This difference between the control subjects and Jon in levels of
hippocampal activity only emerged in the posterior hippocampus,
which does not appear to overlap with the more mid-hippocampal
region activated strongly in controls during the scene construction
task. It could be that although Jon did not engage this mid-
hippocampal region above the statistical threshold, he perhaps
activated it to a level that is not different from controls. However,
the parameter estimate plots from across the hippocampus show
that Jon's right hippocampus was essentially non-responsive.
Moreover, as we have noted before in relation to P01 (Mullally
et al., 2012), any intra-hippocampal considerations in patients
with signiﬁcant hippocampal damage must be treated with cau-
tion, because while it is possible to assign coordinates in stereo-
tactic space to fMRI activations, what exactly this means for a
grossly atrophied hippocampus is uncertain. Jon's atrophy is along
the entire length of the hippocampus. Attempting to infer localisa-
tion of function within the hippocampus in this context may be
Fig. 5. The average parameter estimates from three regions (deﬁned using
anatomical masks – see Section 2) within the core network for Jon, P01 and the
control participants: the hippocampus (HC), parahippocampal cortex (PHC) and
retrosplenial cortex (RSC), for the scenes – objects contrast.
Fig. 6. The average parameter estimates (scenes-objects contrast) within the right
hippocampus (delineated with an anatomical mask—see Section 2) for scene, object
and ﬁxation baseline conditions.
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futile, as anterior/posterior distinctions might not now be
observed. We conclude, therefore, that while Jon's scene construc-
tion showed a number of commonalities with that of controls and
P01, it did not seem to depend on the hippocampus in the same
way as scene construction in controls and P01. So how did Jon
manage to produce descriptions of scenes without, or with
substantially less involvement of, his hippocampus?
Klein (2012, 2013), Klein and Lax (2010), Klein et al. (2002) have
emphasised that mental simulation is possible using semantic
memory. We suggest that the ability of patients with DA to acquire
semantic knowledge may be critical in their execution of a form of
scene construction. They may use this preserved semantic and
world knowledge, a sense of familiarity, and intact reasoning ability
about how imagined events logically unfold, to describe scenes, but
they do not vividly experience these scenes. Interestingly, Jon
reported that he ﬁnds scene construction effortful and commented
that his scenes are not instant pictures, and that he does not
imagine scenes in everyday life. By contrast controls and P01
describe their construction of scenes as automatic. It may therefore
be important to draw a distinction between scenes that are
effortfully constructed and described, and those that are automati-
cally constructed, truly visualised in the imagination and vividly
experienced, with the latter depending on the hippocampus.
Compared to controls, Jon exhibited up-regulation of several
areas within the scene construction network, including retro-
splenial and posterior parietal cortices, as well as recruiting
additional parts of prefrontal cortex. We offer some speculations
about the reasons for these increased areas of activity compared
with the control participants. The retrosplenial cortex is consis-
tently engaged by a range of tasks that examine episodic memory,
imagining the future, spatial navigation, and scene processing
(Vann et al., 2009). It has been suggested that its core function
may be related to the geometric layout of scenes (Epstein, 2008),
or transitioning between egocentric and allocentric perspectives
(Vann et al., 2009; Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012). Along with the
posterior parietal cortex, this could mean that in his attempt to
construct coherent scenes, Jon is over-reliant on spatial processing
in these areas as a means of compensating for the lack of spatial
input from his hippocampus. Related to this, the retrosplenial
cortex has recently been implicated in processing the most stable
landmarks in the environment (Auger, Mullally, & Maguire, 2012).
Its up-regulation could also index the retrieval of stable items, but
which Jon's dysfunctional hippocampus cannot use to construct a
spatially coherent scene.
There could be other reasons for the up-regulation/recruitment
of medial and lateral parietal and prefrontal cortices regions in Jon.
Several of these areas have been linked with semantic processing
in a meta-analysis of 120 neuroimaging studies by Binder, Desai,
Graves, and Conant (2009). Given that Jon has preserved semantic
knowledge, he may be over-reliant upon this when attempting to
construct imagined scenes. The prefrontal activations could be
related to Jon's effortful attempts and/or strategic reasoning to
support his performance on scene construction tasks, compensat-
ing to some degree for the absence of hippocampal support. A
similar ﬁnding was apparent when autobiographical memory was
assessed longitudinally during fMRI in a patient with semantic
dementia. The patient's recollection was initially supported by the
classic autobiographical memory network (Svoboda, McKinnon, &
Levine, 2006), including atrophied tissue in hippocampus and
temporal neocortex. This was subsequently augmented by up-
regulation in ventromedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex,
right lateral temporal cortex, and medial parietal cortex (Maguire,
Kumaran, Hassabis, & Kopelman, 2010).
The data from Jon and the other patients with DA show that
one can get reasonably far in describing scene-like entities in the
absence of signiﬁcant hippocampal input. It is perhaps surprising
then that patients with amnesia whose hippocampal damage
occurred in adulthood do not engage in a similar strategy; after
all, they would have accumulated a great deal of semantic and
world knowledge prior to sustaining their lesions. Patients with
DA, in some cases with perinatal hippocampal damage predating
the formation of any memory, may never have had the experience
of truly visualising scenes in their imagination. Perhaps most of
what they glean is ‘second-hand’, so to speak, from other people's
descriptions of scenes. Their default is a semantic system. By
contrast, in our experience, patients with adult-acquired hippo-
campal damage and amnesia are acutely aware of what they have
lost. They appreciate that their current attempts to visualise scenes
in their imagination is a far cry from their pre-morbid ability. Their
default is still an episodic system. Therefore, when asked to
construct a vivid scene that can be visualised in the imagination
they know, perhaps unlike patients with DA, that they simply
cannot comply.
In summary, we have shown that DA patient Jon with
perinatally-acquired bilateral hippocampal damage and consequent
DA is able to construct and describe scenes but this is not associated
with increased hippocampal activity of the magnitude observed in
control participants and patient P01. Other patients with DA should
be scanned using fMRI to test the reliability of this ﬁnding further.
In addition, it would be useful to explore the basis on which DA
patients make their subjective ratings of their constructed scenes.
Our data show that a type of non-hippocampal dependent scene
construction is possible, perhaps mediated by semantic memory.
However, we argue that the inadequacy of this strategy is revealed
when scene construction is required as the basis for functions such
as episodic memory and spatial navigation, where the inability to
construct and truly visualise scenes in the mind's eye results in
signiﬁcant impairments of the type observed in amnesia.
Fig. 7. Comparison between Jon and P01. P01 activated his right hippocampus signiﬁcantly more than Jon. Results are displayed at a threshold of po0.05 (FWE-corrected,
whole brain) on a sagittal (left) and coronal slice (right) from the averaged structural MRI scan of the control participants. The colour bar indicates the z-scores associated
with each voxel. R¼right side of the brain.
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